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During the 1950s, senior executives at AT&T briefly hoped that the human-
ities could revitalize their company. Trained mostly in technical subjects such 
as engineering or business, their midlevel employees, they feared, were narrow 
in their interests and knowledge, mechanical in their approach to problems, 
and incapable of independent thought. Thus CEO Cleo Craig initiated a pilot 
program, The Institute of Humanistic Studies for Executives, designed to enrich 
and broaden the minds of a select number of employees. Each year starting in 
1953, AT&T relieved approximately twenty managers of all work duties for ten 
months and sent them to the University of Pennsylvania to receive a liberal arts 
education, free of charge. Participants not only read more than a typical PhD 
student in a year of graduate work, they visited museums, attended classical 
music concerts, and mingled with prominent intellectuals over cocktails.
AT&T had tried out a similar initiative in the 1920s. Then president of New 
Jersey Bell Chester Barnard sent hundreds of his employees to the University 
of Pennsylvania for several one-week periods to study the humanities, but he 
decided that the program, to be successful, would need to provide a lengthier, 
more rigorous experience. By the 1950s, AT&T was finally making the ample 
profits that Barnard’s vision necessitated, and so, under Cleo Craig’s recom-
mendation, the president of Pennsylvania Bell Wilfred D. Gillen and his Vice 
President of Personnel John Markle II reinstituted Barnard’s program.1 Morse 
Peckham, a professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, devised 
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the curriculum, which consisted of courses in philosophy, literature, arts, and 
science, and guest lectures from major intellectuals including Lewis Mumford, 
W. H. Auden, Delmore Schwartz, Henry S. Commager, and David Riesman.2
The Bell employees appreciated certain aspects of the program more than 
others. Some preferred learning about politics and economics to learning about 
art and literature. But they were, on the whole, determined to understand as 
much as they could of what they encountered. One participant became so frus-
trated during the several hours he spent trying to make sense of Ezra Pound’s 
The Pisan Cantos that he had to take an aspirin and a sedative at two in the 
morning in order to sleep.3 And practically everyone, apparently, struggled and 
fretted tirelessly over the presentations they were required to give on individual 
chapters of James Joyce’s Ulysses; one musically inclined presenter, seduced 
by the Sirens episode, devoted forty-two hours to tracing its themes and mo-
tifs.4 All participants relished the opportunity to meet famous thinkers; getting 
to “walk with the greats” was an “ego-building experience,” according to one 
survey of the program.5 And generally speaking the reviews were extremely 
Figure 1: Industrial Psychologist Morris Viteles (second from left, front row) 
with several participants from the Institute of Humanistic Study (date unknown). 
[Box No. V68, Folder No.8, Morris Viteles papers] Archives of the History of 
American Psychology, The Center for the History of Psychology, The University 
of Akron.
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favorable, with many alumni calling the ten-month period the most significant 
and memorable of their entire life.6
The program’s popularity, of course, was not enough to justify its substan-
tial costs. Its administrators also needed to demonstrate that it would serve the 
interests of AT&T. To that end, they put forth a series of arguments, in commit-
tee reports, at conferences, and in internal memos, designed to establish the use-
fulness of the humanities to business. They also hired industrial psychologist 
Morris Viteles and the consulting firm Douglass Williams Associates to study 
the effects of the program; both gave the Institute positive reviews. AT&T was 
initially pleased with the results and instituted similar, though less extensive 
programs at Swarthmore, Williams, Dartmouth, and Northwestern. But support 
for the program gradually waned, and the new CEO at AT&T Frederick R. Kap-
pel, who took office in 1956, was unconvinced of the Institute’s effectiveness 
and discontinued it four years into his tenure.
Why was AT&T’s experiment confined to the 1950s? One key factor was 
the cold war: during its early years intellectuals working within humanities 
departments and businessmen were both committed to defending American 
capitalism. A collective revulsion provoked by Stalin’s brutal policies was 
in part responsible for intellectuals’ newfound patriotism, but the McCarthy-
spearheaded witch hunt also prompted many to adopt an uncharacteristically 
sanguine attitude toward their country’s political and economic system.7 While 
the motives behind such attitudes were diverse and complicated, the sense of a 
shared cold war mission and a belief that the humanities could serve this mis-
sion were parts of the rationale for AT&T’s Institute. 8
But implicit commonalities and forms of mutual dependence between cor-
porations and humanities departments date further back to the end of the 1800s 
when the two spheres assumed their modern form.9 Indeed, throughout most of 
the past century, the liberal arts have served to prepare people for white collar 
work. And while even supporters invariably noted the Institute’s unorthodox 
character, the premise behind it did not go entirely against the grain of conven-
tional wisdom; during the 1950s, business leaders from a variety of companies 
lauded the Institute and stressed the need to increase the role of liberal arts in 
the training of future executives.10 It is worth considering, then, why the idea 
did not catch on more broadly, and why it failed to survive at AT&T. If, dur-
ing the immediate postwar period, the largest public corporation in America 
held that the humanities constituted essential training for businessmen, why, in 
subsequent decades, have humanities departments had such difficulty articulat-
ing the significance or usefulness of what they teach and why have they found 
themselves unable to compete with professional schools focused on subjects 
such as engineering, accounting, and finance? Significantly, the planners of the 
Institute were committed to the notion of humanistic study as valuable in itself, 
and yet a central cause of the program’s discontinuation was its failure to yield 
measurable utility for the company. This episode might, then, appear to yield 
a simple explanation of the humanities’ decline over the past several decades 
8  Timothy Aubry
based on the failure of the field to offer marketable forms of knowledge that can 
translate into company profits, and yet AT&T’s experiment, as I hope to dem-
onstrate, offers no such straightforward lesson. Rather, it suggests that striving 
too hard to satisfy the demands of corporations may be no less perilous a course 
for the humanities than attempting to ignore these demands.
The Rise of Managerial Capitalism
A central concern for AT&T during the 1950s was an apparent dearth of 
individuals ready to assume top management positions in the company. Hiring 
freezes during the Great Depression and World War II had resulted in an age 
gap between the company’s senior leadership and its lower-rung employees. 
Moreover, a majority of the recent hires had technical degrees in engineering 
or business administration.11 While this kind of highly specialized education 
appeared to serve those in the initial stages of their career fairly well, it limited 
their ability to succeed in upper-level management positions. As the Douglass 
Williams Associates report noted, “There seems to exist in the minds of most 
Bell management people an image—a stereotype, really—of the ‘ingrown Tele-
phone man.’ The narrow technician, at home only in his own immediate field 
of competence.”12 Even as most employees were being trained to specialize in 
a specific field, the world was becoming more integrated; thus a broad-gauge, 
future-oriented perspective was necessary, AT&T’s executive leadership be-
lieved, to help the company respond to a set of increasingly interrelated and rap-
idly changing economic, political, and social conditions. In the minds of people 
like Chester Barnard, John Markle, and Wilfred D. Gillen, the best preparation 
for this sort of work was not training in business or engineering, but rather a 
deep and sustained education in the humanities. As a manager came to oversee 
a greater diversity of functions, this education, they believed, would serve as 
an antidote to specialization, allowing him to draw connections between differ-
ent area-specific challenges and make decisions based on a coherent vision of 
AT&T’s broader mission.13
Most companies and most colleges of course operated on the assumption 
that the humanities had a role to play in educating the future businessman. The 
typical vocational degree did generally require at least some humanities course-
work. A central task of managers, after all, is to acquire, organize, and dissemi-
nate information efficiently and transparently, and the teaching of such skills, 
particularly the ability to use standard English, has traditionally taken place in 
humanities departments in the United States.14 Moreover, as the very term sug-
gests, the discipline of the humanities purports to offer knowledge about human 
beings: how they think, how they act in various situations, and how they orga-
nize themselves in relation to each other. “The need of such understanding,” 
Chester Barnard concluded, “is of first importance for the executive; for human 
relations are the essence of managerial, employee, public, and political rela-
tions; and, in most cases, these rather than science, technology, law, or finance 
are the central areas of executive function.”15
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Barnard and others at AT&T, of course, valued the humanities not merely 
for the practical skills that they provided, but also for their ability to foster a 
deeper understanding of the world and a capacity for critical introspection. A 
broadly shared anxiety at this time was that AT&T and other large corporations 
were facilitating the transformation of Americans into unthinking organization 
men. Administrative bureaucracies both within corporations and in the govern-
ment had grown enormously between 1900 and 1950, and this meant that a 
much larger percentage of Americans than ever before served as white collar 
workers in highly specialized, carefully structured departments and performed 
narrowly defined tasks in accordance with preestablished guidelines.16 More-
over, those who worked in the managerial strata generally received fixed sala-
ries that insulated them from the immediate short-term profits and losses of the 
companies that they managed. Sheltered from the vicissitudes of the market, 
risk-averse, and comfortably ensconced in the suburbs, Americans, particularly 
middle-class American men, according to midtwentieth-century critics such as 
David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, and William Whyte, were in danger of losing 
their rugged, independent character.17
The cold war served only to intensify such anxieties. The very system that 
supposedly distinguished the United States from the Soviet Union, entrepre-
neurial capitalism, was in danger of disappearing, and its replacement, corpo-
rate-managerial capitalism, seemed capable of engendering precisely the kind 
of group-oriented mentality typically associated with communism.18 The Insti-
tute of Humanistic Studies, as a cold war initiative, encouraged the modes of 
independent thinking that corporations were thought to discourage, thus aiming 
to forestall the general drift toward conformity. But it also sought to reinforce 
an image of the American corporation as hospitable to creativity, innovation, 
and individual freedom. Given the latter goal, the Institute did not aim to disrupt 
the standard business practices in any dramatic manner. According to Nation 
reporter David Ray, one of the Institute’s university administrators remarked, 
“They want the stimulation of an unthreatening individualism—of an appear-
ance of individualism, not any that would interfere, naturally, with the com-
pany.”19 Considering the results of the Institute, the consulting firm Douglas 
Williams observed, “The ‘change,’ if any, is internal, singular to the man, and 
may be reflected more in what he thinks than how he acts.”20 Though the co-
ordinators of the program did hope that employees’ experiences at the Insti-
tute would influence their work methods after they returned to the company, 
many were content to acknowledge that whatever transformation the program 
inspired would be subtle, perhaps even invisible. If the kind of freedom that 
purportedly thrived within entrepreneurial capitalism had been a freedom of ac-
tion, exemplified by those bold and practical individuals who could turn an idea 
into a concrete enterprise, the kind of freedom that AT&T’s Institute fostered, as 
the Douglas Williams study indicates, was primarily a freedom of pure thought, 
a capacity to understand and imagine one’s world in new and complicated ways 
that did not necessarily produce any concrete changes in behavior. The latter 
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mode of freedom was fit for people in highly circumscribed bureaucratic posi-
tions; confined to the inner life, its existence could be asserted in the absence of 
any outward evidence or changes in the status quo.
In some moments, AT&T claimed that a knowledge of the humanities 
would help its managers direct the company so as to prioritize the public good 
over immediate profits. Ironically, this agenda was also rooted in an anticom-
munist ideology insofar as it sought to increase the scope of corporate power. 
At a forum on the relationship between business and the humanities, Courtney 
C. Brown, an executive at Standard Oil, remarked, “A fourth and final reason 
why business is expanding its interest in the liberal arts, it seems to me, is that 
after several decades of what might be called a defensive posture, business is 
again in a role of greater political and intellectual leadership in our national 
life.”21 Gillen made a similar observation at an Institute of Humanistic Studies 
Conference: “As you know, many thinking business men, educators, and indeed 
intelligent politicians have been greatly concerned by the waning influence of 
business leadership during the last 20 years.”22 Gillen attributed this loss of in-
fluence to the Great Depression, the widespread distrust of private corporations 
that prevailed during that era due to the financial collapse, and the central role 
government had assumed in serving people’s needs. But the newfound prosper-
ity of the 1950s alongside the growing fear of state power fostered by opposi-
tion to communism lent corporations an opportunity to expand their role in 
society and to assert the private sector as the sphere most capable of addressing 
all variety of social ills. Ironically, corporations that adopted this stance were, 
at least rhetorically, accepting the role imposed upon them by postwar labor 
organizations, which had been vigorously demanding that they assume greater 
responsibility for the welfare of their workers.
What the Humanities Do
Although the Institute did not aim to inspire a radical transformation of 
AT&T’s business practices, it did offer the humanities as a way of thinking 
antithetical to the corporate obsession with economic gain and instantaneous 
utility. In the various subjects taught at the Institute, executives would discover 
aesthetic and ethical values while engaging in intellectual pursuits that were not 
designed to serve any immediate function and were thus conceived as worth-
while in themselves. Remarkably, for Barnard, Markle, and Willen, such modes 
of thought might serve AT&T’s interests precisely by virtue of their impracti-
cality, teaching employees to approach their work from a broader, longer-term 
perspective. Though counterintuitive, this seemingly contradictory conception 
of the humanities as useful by virtue of their uselessness was not novel; it had 
its in origin in the way the discipline came to be structured during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American universities catered 
primarily to young men from wealthy families, and their humanities curricula 
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consisted of a study of classical texts in ancient Greek and Latin.23 The knowl-
edge they offered, while an essential constituent of the cultural capital neces-
sary for members of leisured society, appeared utterly useless to those in pursuit 
of a practical career, and thus numerous professional schools in law, medicine, 
and business emerged to meet the needs of the growing middle class. It was 
only after the Civil War that traditional universities began to adapt in order to 
attract a broader subset of the population. Administrators reorganized schools 
into field-specific departments, and as a result the discipline of the humanities 
began to include the subjects that it includes today: literature, history, fine arts, 
philosophy, and religion. During this period, the creation of journals, associa-
tions, and degree protocols served to professionalize many of these subjects. 
Perhaps most importantly, following Harvard president Charles Eliot’s lead, 
a majority of universities across the country developed and expanded gradu-
ate programs designed to provide specialized professional training in various 
subjects while making a bachelor of arts degree a requisite for entry into such 
programs. This ended the competition between these two educational tracks 
and endowed the discipline of the liberal arts with the ambiguous status in re-
lation to questions of utility that has served both as its peculiar virtue and as 
its primary limitation throughout the twentieth century.24 On the one hand, as 
Louis Menand has noted, this institutional structure relieves liberal arts courses 
of the responsibility to prepare students for any given profession, since that task 
has been reserved for a later stage in their education. Thus professors in these 
courses can subscribe to the ideal of disinterested knowledge, knowledge not 
designed to serve another purpose, but valuable in itself. On the other hand, 
the BA requirement maintains that the knowledge offered by an undergraduate 
education is necessary for a majority of future professionals, thus suggesting 
that this knowledge will serve some broadly defined purpose.25
But what might that purpose be? One difficulty confronting the many 
teachers, administrators, and students who have tried to answer this question 
is that no two undergraduate programs are the same in their offerings and their 
requirements, and thus there is no unified body of knowledge or set of skills that 
all college graduates are expected to learn. At the same time that undergraduate 
study assumed an institutionalized position as a prerequisite for entry into the 
white collar professional class in the early twentieth century, its departments 
became more specialized and more disparate, and the education they offered 
became less coherent for any given student and less homogenous across the 
general population. Lending urgency to questions about what kind of education 
colleges and universities should offer students was the dramatic increase in 
enrollments during the early decades of the twentieth century, including thou-
sands of first-generation students—a trend greatly abetted by the passage of 
the G. I. Bill in 1944.26 Between 1920 and 1950, several prestigious colleges 
and universities, including Harvard, Columbia, Darmouth, Stanford, and Wil-
liams, instituted a core curriculum as a part of a general education movement. 
Though they differed from each other in some important respects, these new 
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dispensations all attempted to identify a common body of knowledge across 
several different fields that, in the view of the institution, all students ought 
to master.27 The motives behind this movement were similar to those behind 
AT&T’s Institute of Humanistic Studies. In the rationale of both, the humani-
ties, figured as a standard canon of great works and concepts, could serve as an 
antidote to social fragmentation and intellectual specialization, promoting both 
a unified set of democratic values and a capacity among students for indepen-
dent thought. Harvard presented its general education program specifically as 
a cold war initiative, one that would help defend students against the potential 
lure of communism.28
Deemed useless for any immediate practical purposes, the humanities nev-
ertheless found themselves charged with some weighty responsibilities in cold 
war America. But what actual effects did they produce on those who studied 
the humanities within a university setting? Anxious to justify the Institute’s 
existence, the executive leadership at AT&T hired Morris Viteles to answer this 
question. Viteles administered surveys before and after the experience, and ap-
proximately ten years later he distributed audio recorders to all participants 
and asked them to reflect on how their time at the Institute had influenced them 
both at work and in their personal lives. The explicit reviews of the program 
were almost all favorable, but in the variety of responses he received, one can 
find arguments for and against its efficacy, and in certain frequently repeated 
admissions the risks of justifying the humanities based on their ability to serve 
corporate interests become apparent.
Many of the participants believed that their experience at the Institute made 
them better communicators, better able to grasp the complexity of the prob-
lems that they confronted, and better equipped to engage in long-term eco-
nomic planning. A majority also reported feelings of increased tolerance for 
other opinions and an awareness that certain questions may yield more than one 
answer.29 One commented, “I have a lot more confidence in my own ideas and 
usually before presenting a position paper, especially in the personnel field, I 
find myself exploring all the possible alternatives and try to anticipate all objec-
tions, whether they be political or content-wise.”30 Such awareness tended to 
make them more willing to accept the feedback of employees working under 
them. Several claimed to have become more sensitive to the needs and concerns 
of those whom they managed. One observed that he spent a year helping an 
insecure subordinate develop confidence.31 Some argued that they had become 
less wedded to preconceptions, more inclined to use reasoning to reach conclu-
sions, and thus they held their views about company decisions with greater 
conviction. According to one, “I think the process of arriving at a given busi-
ness decision is now a much slower and I think orderly, organized method and 
I feel much stronger in my logic because I think now I look at many more 
facits [sic] to make a decision.”32 Others, however, reported the opposite effect; 
their increased sensitivity to the contingency of any given argument rendered 
them indecisive and less convinced that they had arrived at the right solution. 
Humanities, Inc.  13
“I appear to be having considerably more trouble reaching decisions, that I’ve 
always been able to see both sides of any question and the Institute reinforced 
that to a rather marked degree.”33
Many employees observed that they had become more independent in their 
thinking and more critical of AT&T. Some reported reduced ambition; they re-
alized that achieving promotion in the company or furthering its profits was 
less important than they previously believed. One admitted that he had become 
“much less interested in advancing the telephone business.”34 Another stated, 
“I am more convinced than ever that attainment of higher and higher levels of 
management is not necessarily the most satisfying reward in life.”35 A third re-
vealed, “I think that as a result of Pennsylvania, I’m not quite as dedicated to the 
telephone business as I would have been without that exposure. . . . I’m not such 
a dedicated Bell ringer.”36 A few indicated that they had felt deeply unmoored 
and disoriented upon returning to AT&T, claiming that the Institute had desta-
bilized their priorities.37 “I seem to recall that at the time I had the feeling I was 
being plunged unceremoniously back into the business world and that I was fast 
losing my perspective on what seemed to be larger more important things.”38 A 
majority, according to surveys, attached more significance to aesthetic values 
and less to business values.39 Similarly, many claimed that they now wanted to 
devote more energy to their family and personal life and less to succeeding at 
work.40 A good number had become more involved in communal and civic ac-
tivities, and most indicated that their political beliefs became more liberal as a 
result of their studies. Ironically, this newfound perspective led some to be less 
critical of alternative political and economic systems, including communism.41
If participants became more politically active after their experience, the 
issue they most often confronted was racial politics. While almost all hesitated 
to identify the Institute as the sole or primary agent of their changed attitude, 
several describe serious efforts to promote integration at Bell. One remarked, 
“The studies of the University of Pennsylvania did impress me with the social 
responsibilities of business. This was an eye opener to me and when the prob-
lem came up of how we should handle minority groups, particularly the col-
ored, I volunteered to be the first one to place colored boys in higher rated jobs, 
primarily craft jobs and management jobs.”42 Another discussed his decision 
not to order a change from a manual switchboard to dial at a plant in Illinois to 
avoid laying off fifty female workers, most of whom were African American. 
Although it was the last plant in the state to use a switchboard, he decided “in 
favor of the social consequence argument.”43 A third opted to integrate his divi-
sion despite a Chief Operator’s declaration that “if any nigger comes into this 
office, I am walking out.” Refusing to capitulate, the manager initiated an “ex-
tensive educational campaign” and announced that anyone uncomfortable with 
the new policy was welcome to retire early.44 While work on racial integration 
recurred as the fundamental sign of enhanced liberalism, a few, significantly, 
also discussed labor relations and their increased tolerance for unions. One ar-
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gued that he engaged with workers involved in a walkout with greater sympa-
thy and understanding.45
Though they describe an array of new attitudes and behaviors, most partici-
pants in the program are reluctant to attribute any of their decisions at AT&T, 
whether political or not, entirely to the Institute’s influence. Over and over 
again they refuse to identify direct causality often in almost identical terms. “I 
cannot recall how any specific situation would have been different if I had not 
participated in the program. This in no way means that I feel my managerial be-
havior has not been influenced, but it is so intangible that I cannot say whether 
any specific action directly reflects the impact of the program.”46 “Questions 
like that are hard to answer, in fact, I think they’re almost impossible to answer 
with any degree of certainty.”47 “Frankly, I’m not able to define any specific 
decisions which I think were influenced especially by the courses at the Uni-
versity.”48 “It’s rather difficult as I reflect to try and pinpoint these things and 
say precisely because of what took place at Pennsylvania, I am now acting thus 
and so I doubt seriously if this could ever be said.”49 Given this uniformity 
among the participants’ answers, one might conclude that, if not their practi-
cal decisions in the company, then at least their unwillingness to ascribe any 
definitive positive impact to the Institute was the product of what they learned 
there. Repeated claims that the program taught them to defer final judgments, 
to question assumptions, and to recognize the complexity and ambiguity of 
situations under examination, often voiced in the same breath as their refusal, 
notwithstanding their extreme enthusiasm, to deliver a final verdict about the 
value of the Institute, bear out this interpretation. Their humanities training, in 
other words, seems to have encouraged a resistance to the kind of categorical 
assertions and straightforward positive appraisals that might have argued in 
favor of the program’s continuation.
The Humanistic Corporation
There were many reasons to believe that the Institute of Humanistic Stud-
ies might thrive in the long term, exemplifying the value of liberal arts as a 
necessary preparation for a career in business. A growing concern during the 
postwar period was how to train people to be effective managers and how to 
distinguish those who were well suited for such work from those who were not. 
In earlier periods, when smaller businesses were the norm, such distinctions 
were easier to make. The measure of a good manager was simply whether or not 
his business succeeded; if it failed, he was out of a job. By contrast, the postwar 
corporate manager, working in a massive organization, could offer a mediocre 
performance without necessarily undermining either his prospects or those of 
his company. Once free market realities no longer unambiguously separated 
the effective from the ineffective, in other words, new forms of legitimation 
were needed to produce and enforce the invidious distinction between white 
collar workers and those supposedly qualified only for jobs lower in the social 
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hierarchy. And one could argue that the humanities were, for better or worse, 
well equipped to provide the subtle, institutionally sanctioned distinction re-
quired for corporate management positions, insofar as they could claim to of-
fer individuals a certain intellectual capacity, a psychological sensitivity, and a 
subtle polish, while suggesting that these virtues and their consequences eluded 
rational measurement. One participant in the Institute admitted his reluctance 
to “put an absolute or solid value on the progress so far as I am concerned.” But 
the chance to reflect on the program, he continued, “has reconfirmed my feeling 
that the value is there even though it is difficult to put a finger directly on it.”50 
Although the usefulness of this kind of education for managers was difficult 
to verify, it was equally difficult to disprove or discount. Managers who were 
trained in liberal arts could assert their superiority over others who lacked such 
knowledge while tacitly maintaining that the basis for their superiority was too 
subtle to be subject to any crude outward demonstration. In his proposal for the 
Institute, Morse Peckham raised the question, “Of what use are [the humanities] 
in the business world? How can a ‘good-in-itself’ that needs no justification 
be translated into a world in which everything must be justified?”51 While his 
proposal offered answers to this problem persuasive enough to convince AT&T 
to fund the Institute, it is worth noting that this notion of the ‘good-in-itself’ 
is not as alien to the corporate managerial sphere as Peckham makes it sound. 
A key responsibility of the manager, according to an AT&T internal report, 
was to ensure that his workers were fulfilled in their jobs: “Mature growth is a 
continuous process toward the fulfillment of what a person is uniquely capable 
of becoming.” “The manager, therefore, who helps people to grow is one who 
can accept the idea of each individual becoming himself—and who makes an 
effective team out of such people.”52
The report emphasizes the emotional and psychological development of 
the people the manager oversees, their ability to achieve a sense of individual 
identity through work, rather than their capacity to further company profits. In 
his analysis of what the liberal arts could offer corporations, Charles A. Nelson, 
contributor to the Harvard Business Review, articulates this priority even more 
explicitly:
Most executives’ decisions at the top level affect other man-
agers—their lives, their satisfactions in their work, and their 
ability to perform the kind of job they can be proud of. It 
is possible to organize a company in which the opposite oc-
curs—in which men are almost of necessity made worse be-
cause of their association with the corporation. Executives 
have it within their power to frustrate the creative energies of 
most of the men under their direction or to help them to fulfill 
their capacities.
It was the moral imperative of Immanuel Kant, the Ger-
man philosopher, that every man must be treated as an end in 
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himself. This means that men are not tools to be “handled,” 
for tools are implements for some other end.53
The manager, in this formulation, becomes a therapist whose Kantian human-
ism causes him to reverse means and ends, so that he treats the company as a 
means of furthering the happiness and fulfillment of his workers rather than his 
workers as a means of furthering the interests of the company. Like the intel-
lectual tasks that comprise a liberal arts education, Nelson suggests, the tasks of 
a manager ought to be rewarding in themselves. Thus the white collar corporate 
sphere becomes the promised terminus of the American dream, a realm of pure, 
immediate fulfillment, whose activities constitute their own reward.
While some may have accused Nelson of wishful thinking, structural 
changes in the economy made it possible for him and others to conceive of the 
managerial sphere in this manner. Significantly, management and ownership 
of companies had largely parted ways by the middle of the twentieth century. 
For a variety of reasons—some economic, some political, some legal—large 
corporations came to depend upon a myriad number of individual stockholders 
for their capital, each of whom had only a tiny stake in any given company, 
while the task of running these companies fell to a corps of salaried profes-
sional managers, whose compensation remained relatively fixed, regardless 
of the company’s immediate profits and losses.54 As numerous observers have 
noted, this situation meant greater power for managers than owners, and it also 
meant that the former could seek to further priorities other than the bottom-
line interests of the latter. Such autonomy entailed potential risks and potential 
benefits. On the one hand, as recent developments have shown, managers, es-
pecially higher-level executives, could behave irresponsibly, disregarding their 
fiduciary obligations, draining their company’s funds, gutting the pensions and 
retirement accounts of small investors, while granting themselves unjustified 
monetary rewards. On the other hand, however, it meant that managers could, 
if they were so motivated, make their companies serve not only profits but also 
the public good—the good of their employees and the good of society, thus 
turning corporations into benevolent civic agents. Indeed, as Kenneth Lipar-
tito has persuasively argued, corporations are structurally designed to direct 
individual urges toward a “larger collective purpose” and can thus operate to 
contain selfishness and build character in accord with ideals similar to those 
propounded by turn-of-the century reformist and utopian movements—some 
of which in fact incorporated to take advantage of legal protections.55 One can 
see how a corporation designed according to this model might be amenable to 
Kantian ethics and might require workers with a background in the humanities 
of the kind the Institute sought to offer.
Notwithstanding such idealistic conceptions, many employees did, as crit-
ics such as Whyte and Mills observed, find managerial work to be unfulfilling, 
and thus the Institute sought to offer a rich intellectual life as an implicit com-
pensation for the disappointments produced by an unrewarding job. Indeed, a 
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study of the humanities did not merely serve as a substitute gratification; it also 
helped to engender the very mind-set necessary to accept the limited role im-
posed upon the white collar worker by the corporation. Encountering the wide 
range of human experiences, struggles, and accomplishments that the Institute 
sought to crystallize in one year of liberal arts study was mentally enriching, to 
be sure, but it was also humbling, apt to produce a feeling of individual insig-
nificance. One participant stated that after the program, “I had departed rather 
abruptly from the technical organizational man approach and seconly [sic], I 
was quite unsure of what I really did know and very insecure in the realization 
of the limited knowledge that I really had of the world around me.”56 A sec-
ond admitted, “I am much more keenly aware of my own inadequacies, of the 
amount that I do not know about things and about the tremendous number of 
factors that you have to consider in trying to arrive at a reasonable and fair de-
cision.”57 A third remarked, “Some of the things we worry about and strive for 
in the business in terms of measured performance seemed rather insignificant 
compared to the sweep of history, the great occurrences of history, such as the 
Renaissance or the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution and so forth.”58 The 
individual, as conceived by the Institute, was necessarily a miniscule part of a 
massive, vastly complicated world, but this was exactly the position that the 
white collar worker occupied relative to the corporation.
A broadened perspective thus served both to rationalize and compensate 
for the individual’s narrow scope of agency. By increasing participants’ capac-
ity to comprehend and make connections between disparate phenomena, the 
Institute allowed them to gain an intellectual purchase on a wider set of opera-
tions and activities, from which they were in practice excluded, including the 
myriad functions performed by AT&T. The Institute’s celebration of the interior 
as opposed to the practical life, combined with its efforts to encourage an intel-
lectual appreciation of those struggles, ideas, and forces that are greater than 
any individual, helped equip the executive to recognize and embrace his nar-
rowly circumscribed position as inevitable, but also to identify psychologically 
and symbolically with the corporation. One participant testified to this effect 
rather explicitly:
So, I have now many, many, times kind have [sic] taken a step 
backward and looked at our operation which is an ordinary, 
it’s a high speed, it’s a daily routine day in and day out kind 
of a function and yet the information that we’re dealing with, 
the data that we put out, etc., when you look at it objectively 
and recognize that there is a tremdous [sic] romance that runs 
all through this thing if only we could pause and somehow 
illuminate this and tell our story in a way that would take 
the mundane take the routine take the daily chore kind of 
thing out of it and produce an entirely new elixir of life I 
guess, Where [sic] each day you come in, while you’re go-
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ing to be doing basically the same thing day in and day out, 
you recognize that all of the surrounding things that produce 
this daily media which comes in perfectly standard, normal 
highly specialized, highly routine form, has about it an aura 
of romance, an aura of adventure and so forth, that is very, 
very stimulating.59
Wholly aware of the dull, routine tasks that an AT&T employee must perform, 
the respondent nevertheless believes it is possible to find such work exciting 
through a modification of individual perspective of the kind brought about by 
the Institute. Though forced to do “basically the same thing day in and day out,” 
his awareness of the “surrounding things” of the company as a whole—its tire-
lessly consistent performance, its scope, its perfectly standardized dissemina-
tion of media—enables him to view his job as romantic.60
Intangible Tasks
Given these striking, if generally unnoticed, links between humanistic 
study and the needs of corporations, why did AT&T decide to discontinue the 
Institute, and why have the humanities come to play such a marginal role in the 
training of future business executives? It is important to note, first of all, that 
many of the connections that I have been describing were generally not a part 
of the explicit rationale for the Institute, and they were incapable of playing 
this role, since their announcement would foreground potentially unflattering 
features of both the corporation and the humanities. Management would likely 
not want to advertise its tendency to downplay the importance of company 
profits as a basis for embracing the anti-utilitarian outlook of the humanities. 
Nor would liberal arts departments want to admit that the humbling effect of 
confronting world history as well as great works of art and literature could 
ultimately help individuals accept their disempowered position within corpora-
tions. And neither would be inclined to acknowledge that a liberal arts educa-
tion may serve merely as an arbitrary means of legitimation for white collar 
workers irrespective of any clear evidence that the knowledge learned actually 
enhances a manager’s performance.
Despite industrial psychologist Morris Viteles’s vigorous support of the 
Institute backed up by purportedly scientific evidence, the leadership at AT&T 
eventually asserted the dearth of demonstrable benefits to the company as a 
reason to end the program.61 This was an interesting rationale, given that the 
planners of the program had specifically requested that instructors devise the 
curriculum without any concern for its corporate utility. In his initial proposal, 
Professor Morse Peckham noted that many at AT&T would want the course 
content of the program to underline how the humanities could serve the in-
terests of business. His answer was unequivocal: “It is, then, impossible and 
undesirable to choose the subjects and direct the teaching in such a way that 
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the program will have an immediate, obvious, and useful relationship to busi-
ness.”62 The executives at AT&T found such claims persuasive. In a “Report 
of Presidents’ Committee on Management Development,” they described the 
premises upon which the program was initially based:
1) The study of the humanities—unrelated to business—
would produce the most constructive effect.
2) The faculty that was not conscious of the need for 
practical consequences would do the best job.63
The problem AT&T faced, significantly, was an abundance of technically trained 
specialists incapable of envisioning the company’s long-term future or concern-
ing themselves with anything other than their day-to-day tasks and problems. 
To challenge such tendencies, planners of the program, both academic and cor-
porate, offered the humanities as an anti-utilitarian enterprise, as valuable in 
itself, and as immeasurable in its effects; and they chose the professors and the 
content of the courses to reinforce this conception. But then upon initiating the 
program, the company immediately sought to measure its effectiveness, thus 
hoping to establish the utility of that which it had already defined as opposed 
to the notion of measurable utility. According to President John Markle II, “We 
treated [the Institute] like any other business decision; that is we applied a par-
ticular approach to a current problem because we felt our money would be well 
spent and would eventually pay off.”64
Ironically, what doomed the relationship between corporate management 
and the humanities was not a lack of compatibility between the two, but rather 
a fatal congruity: both involved tasks that were largely intangible and aimed to 
produce results whose value was difficult to articulate or quantify. As Peter E. 
Drucker, author of the 1954 seminal text The Practice of Management, put it, 
“Even the people in a business often do not know what their management does 
and what it is supposed to be doing, how it acts and why, whether it does a good 
job or not.”65 A remark by Bell president Chester Barnard bears out Drucker’s 
statement: “Leaders lead. This implies activity, and suggests the obvious ques-
tion, ‘What is it they do?’ Now I must confess that heretofore on the few occa-
sions when I have been asked: ‘What do I do?’ I have been unable to reply in-
telligibly.”66 Describing the job of the executive, one participant at the Institute 
confessed, “I guess you’d say the leaders don’t do any work, they influence the 
people who do the work.”67 His observation echoes the pejorative conclusions 
reached by sociologist C. Wright Mills in his analysis of the white collar sphere:
Fewer individuals manipulate things, more handle people 
and symbols. . . . The shift in needed skills is another way 
of describing the rise of the white-collar workers, for their 
characteristic skills involve the handling of paper and money 
and people. They are expert at dealing with people transiently 
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and impersonally; they are masters of the commercial, pro-
fessional, and technical relationship. The one thing they do 
not do is live by making things; rather, they live off the social 
machineries that organize and coordinate the people who do 
make things.68
Given both the increasingly elaborate structures within which managers oper-
ated and the symbolic and psychological nature of the work they performed, 
objectively measuring what they contributed to the company became difficult.
Since AT&T conceived of the humanities as a discipline by definition de-
void of measurable utility, and since the functions and purposes of the manager 
in a large corporation in the 1950s had become themselves sufficiently intan-
gible as to defy objective assessment, the task of measuring scientifically how 
the Institute of Humanistic Studies could enhance the managerial capacities of 
its participants turned out to be well-nigh impossible. No wonder one executive 
dismissed the claim that the humanities could be of use to a business executive 
in a memo to Morris Viteles as an “unproved hypothesis.”69 Although support-
ers of the Institute argued for a view of management as a kind of art and the 
manager as a creative free thinker, they could not compete with a different 
notion of management that was becoming increasingly dominant: that of the 
scientific manager who operated according to empirically verifiable principles.
The postwar period witnessed a remarkable growth in business manage-
ment education programs. Although professional business schools, such as 
Harvard and Wharton, had existed since the early part of the twentieth century, 
the percentage of students majoring in business grew precipitously during the 
middle of century, from 3.2 percent of all bachelor’s degrees during the 1919–
20 academic year to 17 percent from 1949 to 1950, and graduate programs in 
business studies saw their enrollments rise even more dramatically, doubling 
between 1953 and 1963 and tripling in the following decade.70 Accompanying 
these were numerous on- and off-site executive training programs, of which 
AT&T was one example. As Kenneth R. Andrews notes in a Harvard Business 
Review article:
The growth of educational programs for practicing executives 
both at universities and in their own companies has been one 
of the most conspicuous developments in business education 
since 1946. But the chorus of enthusiasm for these efforts 
no longer drowns out skeptical sounds as the wary and the 
suspicious turn their attention to the “advanced” management 
movement. Not entirely overwhelmed by the traditional will-
ingness of Americans to accept education on faith, this skep-
ticism may well be about to erupt as a demand for proof.71
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Andrew’s interest in proof is telling; in both their efforts to meet the demands 
of corporations and in their desire to achieve academic legitimacy, business 
schools during the postwar period increasingly sought to turn the study of ef-
fective managerial practices into a rigorous, empirical science.72
One possible response to the apparent intangibility and immeasurability of 
the tasks that a manager performs is to embrace these characteristics and thus 
refuse all efforts to systematize the profession; the other is to devise ever more 
elaborate methods for analyzing, assessing, and standardizing that which ap-
pears to elude scientific measure. During the 1950s, business schools and cor-
porations collectively embraced the latter. Even Peter Drucker, who supported 
humanistic training and acknowledged that “management can never be an exact 
science,” said of his project:
This entire book is based on the proposition that the days of 
the ‘intuitive’ managers are numbered. This book assumes 
that the manager can improve his performance in all areas of 
management, including the managing of a business, through 
the systematic study of principles, the acquisition of orga-
nized knowledge and the systematic analysis of his own per-
formance in all areas of his work and job and on all levels of 
management.73
The emphasis on scientifically measurable management methods entailed a pri-
oritization of efficiency and profitability. As Robert R. Locke has noted, the 
neoclassical economic theories, which provided a foundation for the scientific 
paradigm, treat the maximization of profits not only as the goal, but also as the 
very premise of managerial knowledge, the universal constant that makes eco-
nomic analysis possible.74
This priority in turn entailed a subordination of other potential goals, in-
cluding the fulfillment of workers or the public good. When the rational assess-
ment of managerial efficacy becomes a central aim of both business schools 
and corporations, then productivity, efficiency, and profits necessarily become 
the focus of concern, since they are relatively easy to measure. As one AT&T 
report noted, “One of the problems that limits the effective use of the available 
incentives is the difficulty of accurately judging management performance. The 
result may be an overstressing of the statistical measures of performance in line 
jobs.”75 To be sure, other factors, including the well-being and psychological 
health of worker, do not entirely disappear; the field of industrial psychology, 
which experienced rapid growth in the 1950s, is centered around measuring 
these; but they are nonetheless harder to quantify.76 And other more intangi-
ble, longer-term, and indirect consequences of a corporation’s operations, like 
the public good or the cohesion of the community are almost impossible to 
determine scientifically. The widespread embrace of a scientific managerial 
paradigm, in other words, represented not only a repudiation of training in the 
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liberal arts, but also of the conception of the corporation as a socially respon-
sible agent, dedicated to building character and ameliorating the ill effects of 
an unrestrained free market. Though this progressive vision was, as Lipartito 
has asserted, a structural possibility of the corporation, it remained during the 
postwar years mostly unrealized, and the refusal of this possibility arguably 
guaranteed the demise of the Institute and other similar initiatives.
Historian Mark D. Bowles suggests that the Institute’s tendency to make 
its participants more tolerant of anticapitalist thought may have been in part 
responsible for its discontinuation. While the various assessments of the pro-
gram conducted by Douglas Williams Associates and by Morris Viteles confirm 
that participants did become more critical of the United States and less critical 
of communism, whether or not these results influenced AT&T’s eventual deci-
sion is unclear.77 The only rationale indicated by the archival record was the 
program’s perceived inability to demonstrate that it was producing measurable 
benefits for the company. “The committee believes the System has been moving 
into liberal arts exposure faster than our knowledge about what this contributes 
to management development would warrant. . . . The committee also believes 
that future experimental programs at colleges should be based on an adequate 
prior investigation of the needs of participants, and adequate assessment of pro-
gram accomplishments.”78
The company’s decision of course was likely rooted at least indirectly in 
cold war anxieties. The growth of managerial power and the expansion of both 
corporate and government bureaucracies inspired, as I have noted, anxieties 
that the United States was coming to resemble the Soviet Union. The efforts to 
measure and assess management practices in scientific fashion aimed to trace 
the causal links between such practices and the company’s profits or losses. As 
Drucker asserts:
Management must always, in every decision and action, put 
economic performance first. It can only justify its existence 
and its authority by the economic results it produces. There 
may be great non-economic results: the happiness of the 
members of the enterprise, the contribution to the welfare or 
culture of the community, etc. Yet management has failed if 
it fails to produce economic results. It has failed if it does 
not supply goods and services desired by the consumer at a 
price the consumer is willing to pay. It has failed if it does not 
improve or at least maintain the wealth-producing capacity of 
the economic resources entrusted to it.79
While efforts at assessment and systematization of the kind recommended by 
Drucker may have curtailed the very freedom and creativity within the corpora-
tion that the Institute, as a cold war initiative, sought to buttress, these efforts 
also worked to reconnect managerial decisions with measurable consequences 
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in the free market, thus limiting the modes of bureaucratic authority that many 
saw as the greatest threat to American capitalism. Though offered as a patriotic 
endeavor, the Institute tended to further an image of corporate management as 
less rather than more answerable to the market, and hence it fell victim to the 
liberal, anticommunist ideology that it was designed to support.
Humanistic Utility
The tendency to conceive of the work that managers and businessmen per-
form in narrowly economic terms during the years after the Institute’s demise 
alarmed some of its alumni. One notes, “There was an observation that the 
young people today in our colleges and universities are not being particularly 
attracted to business because they are not aware of the challenge of business 
today. They seem to be of a mind that the only purpose of business is to make 
a profit and that this is insufficient for them in terms of the fulfillment of their 
lives in the singular pursuit of a profit motive.”80 Although the respondent ex-
presses concern about the decrease of interest in business among undergradu-
ates, it has been the humanities, not business, that have arguably experienced a 
crisis in recent decades. While the number of students majoring in business and 
other vocational subjects has increased significantly in the past forty years, the 
number of those majoring in the humanities has decreased.81 Between 1972 and 
1988, the percentage of bachelor degrees in arts and social sciences fell from 45 
to 27 percent.82 Meanwhile, the percentage of students pursuing a major in the 
humanities decreased by more than half, from 17 to 8 percent.83
Decreased enrollments among undergraduates represent of course only 
one problem among many for the humanities. As universities have come to 
depend more and more on government and corporate grants, the majority aimed 
at expanding programs in the sciences and business, humanities departments, 
often regarded as an economic burden by administrators—one that brings neg-
ligible value to the university—have had their funding cut.84 Thus, they have 
been forced to staff a significant proportion of their courses with underpaid, 
exploited adjuncts, drawn from the ever growing ranks of graduate students and 
PhDs, whose precarious situation has become, according to many observers, a 
necessary and structural, rather than an accidental or temporary, feature of the 
entire enterprise.85 Such tendencies seem likely to threaten the very existence 
of tenure, and as administrators continually usurp power over the operations 
of humanities departments in the name of economic efficiency, this and other 
protections for academic freedom now appear to be in jeopardy.86
These developments have produced an array of anguished responses and 
proposed solutions among academics. Some, such as Frank Donoghue, have 
predicted the demise of the discipline as we know it.87 Others, including Cary 
Nelson and Marc Bousquet, have argued that professors need to band together 
in unions or professional organizations to defend tenure, academic freedom, 
and the right of faculty to govern themselves.88 Still others, such as Menand, 
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have argued that various professional prerogatives have in fact damaged the hu-
manities by shielding scholars’ work from the rigors of the market and the de-
mand for broader relevance that such a market would exact. Many have claimed 
that academics need to do a better job of arguing for the usefulness and value 
of the subjects they write about and teach, suggesting that professors should ar-
ticulate how their discipline helps to produce skills necessary for both engaged 
citizenship within a democratic system and a variety of vocational pursuits.89 In 
some universities, humanities departments have attempted to reorganize them-
selves in order to meet the demands of a corporate culture focused on instantly 
measurable results, objective assessments, and marketable forms of utility.
The effort to revise the humanities curriculum so as to prioritize marketable 
skills makes a certain amount of sense. The perception that liberal arts classes 
do not prepare students for jobs in business and finance is obviously partially 
responsible for decreased enrollments. And yet it is important to recognize that 
liberal arts departments are not presently in a state of decline. They suffered 
their most significant setbacks during the 1970s and 1980s, and these shrinking 
numbers may have partially resulted from the decision of corporations such as 
AT&T to embrace a scientific model of management training in the name of 
free market principles of the kind offered by programs in business and finance. 
Since then, however, the percentage of humanities majors, as Michael Bérubé 
observes, has remained constant.90 Given this relative stability, one might say 
that the greatest risk to humanities departments is their own urge to overstate 
the crisis that they are confronting and thus renovate their curriculum and re-
vise their practices in accordance with corporate-managerial standards in a self-
destructive effort to save themselves.
The Institute of Humanistic Studies made valiant efforts to measure the 
utility of its curriculum in order to demonstrate the value it might offer to AT&T, 
and this, ironically enough, rendered it even more vulnerable to attack, espe-
cially given the inability of its participants to explain exactly how their year 
off had made them more effective workers. Indeed, whatever results the Insti-
tute produced were practically guaranteed to disappoint AT&T’s management, 
especially when compared with other business-oriented vocational programs 
whose curriculum was specifically designed to produce legible indicators of 
business competence. In fact, one could argue that humanities departments in 
general simply cannot compete with such programs when they attempt to sat-
isfy criteria articulated within a corporate culture. And when they do make such 
attempts, they risk sacrificing their specificity—the kinds of knowledge and 
forms of thought that they are uniquely qualified to foster. This does not mean 
that humanities departments can entirely declare their independence from the 
corporation. It is not mere coincidence that both achieved their modern identity 
at the same moment, in the late 1800s. Whether explicitly or not, the bachelor 
of arts degree has attracted students by implicitly promising to legitimize their 
entry into the white collar corporate professional sphere. But liberal arts pro-
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grams have been able and will continue to serve this function without cravenly 
catering to corporate-inspired demands for marketable skills.
Interestingly enough, both the academic and the corporate planners of 
AT&T’s institute held that the humanities were valuable in themselves, regard-
less of what uses they might subsequently serve, and these planners seemed to 
celebrate disinterested inquiry for its own sake, because they regarded it as an 
anticorporate value. That the participants in the program discovered intense, 
unprecedented fulfillment in the intellectual experiences they had while in the 
program would seem to validate the view, voiced most passionately by Morse 
Peckham, that humanistic study is an intrinsically good activity. One might 
note, however, that the experiences of these alumni, in the decades after they 
graduated, also suggest, albeit anecdotally, the long-term usefulness of what 
they learned. Significantly, the utility they identify was not corporate utility; 
they were almost never able to identify any decisions they made on the job as a 
result of their time in the Institute that contributed to corporate profits. Rather, 
they describe an effect of their education similar to that envisioned famously 
by John Dewey in the early part of the twentieth century, and more recently by 
Martha Nussbaum: their year at Pennsylvania appears to have made them bet-
ter, more socially responsible, more civically engaged, more sensitive citizens.91
Admittedly, the participants were reluctant to attribute their subsequent 
choices directly to the influence of the Institute, and their responses to Viteles’s 
questionnaire obviously do not offer scientific proof of the value of the humani-
ties. But it may well be that the particular kinds of contributions, the intellec-
tual, ethical, and affective resources that humanistic study offers society, do not 
lend themselves easily to scientific demonstration or quantification. Moreover 
to attempt to assess these contributions in such terms runs the risk of capitu-
lating to the very corporate values, centered on immediate measurable utility, 
against which the discipline of the humanities must, in order to establish its own 
specific raison d’être, define itself. It is worth emphasizing that the participants 
in the Institute tended to become most eloquent, passionate, and persuasive pre-
cisely when they were describing complex and far-reaching changes in their at-
titude and their approach to various problems whose causal connection to their 
educational experiences they could not definitively trace: when they described 
their commitment to integrating their workplaces in the face of racism, when 
they reported their heightened sensitivity to their subordinates’ psychological 
problems, and even when they struggled to articulate an intangible transforma-
tion of their perspective that eluded objective appraisal. However unscientific 
and tentative, such anecdotal evidence may be the best measure of what the 
humanities have to offer, and if they hope to survive, it is on this admittedly 
uncertain ground that they will have to stake their future.
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